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RESOLVING RETENTION POLARITY: THE PERCEPTIONS OF 
STRUCTURAL STEEL SUBCONTRACTORS 
 
ABSTRACT 
This study aims to understand the perceived polarity between main contractors and subcontractors 
with a view to resolving problems connected with retentions in an environment where a sliding-
retention regime is utilised with a retention rate of 10% for work below NZ $ 200,000. Eight 
structural steel subcontractors operating in Auckland were interviewed. Contrary to popular 
belief, subcontractors are not averse to retentions with most taking a middle ground. Nevertheless, 
the apparently fair practice of using back-to-back contract terms is not seen as fair and 
reasonable. Most solutions acceptable to subcontractors impact negatively on contractors’ cash 
flow highlighting the need for some form of reciprocity from subcontractors (price discounts, 
improved performance, etc.) to induce contractors to offer favourable retention regimes. This 
highlights the need for a theory on ‘retention reciprocity’ to supplement the five theories on 
retentions. However, given that not all contractors can be expected to display reciprocity fairness, 
an interventionist approach may be necessary in order to neutralise any imbalances in power 
between the contracting parties possibly through amendments to the Construction Contracts Act, 
and when doing so, there is a need to exercise much caution as the outcome of chaotic systems 
could be quite unpredictable. 
Keywords: reciprocity, retentions, construction contracts act  
1. INTRODUCTION 
Some countries have declared war on the use of retentions. Some have effectively eliminated 
retentions (Abeysekera, 2009). Others lament, citing unprecedented problems (Abeysekera, 2008). 
Yet, some are convinced that it is an essential vehicle of modern day business. Others point out its 
power and how retentions may be harnessed for greater good (Abeysekera, 2005). Some have already 
created retention based funds to finance construction, given the reluctance of commercial banks to 
understand construction (Abeysekera, 2002, 2003). Others have tried to abolish retentions but failed 
(House of Commons, 2003). Moreover, practices related to retentions vary from country to country, 
from one standard form of contract to another and also from one contractor to another. Rates, limits, 
and release mechanisms vary too with many permutations and combinations. Thus, on the face of it 
there is chaos. It is this phenomenon that is being investigated focussing on perceptions of structural 
steel subcontractors in New Zealand in order to find a way to resolve problems and issues connected 
with retention regimes. 
2. THE NEW ZEALAND CONTEXT 
It is interesting to note that New Zealand is one of the few countries that had legislation on retentions 
as way back as the latter part of the last century with a rate as high as 25%! Whilst the intentions for 
having retentions then were different to the current, this „ancient‟ practice has continued over the 
years but with diminishing rates of retention regulated since 1892 until the act legalising retentions 
were abolished in 1987 leaving industry to regulate itself. Interestingly, the retention regime in New 
Zealand is not a flat one but a sliding one as shown in Fig. 1. 
In formal construction, it is standard practice to use back to back contract terms. Thus, retention 
regimes imposed on main contractors are usually imposed on subcontractors too as it is considered to 
be fair by the main contractors. However, what is interesting about this practice is that on large 
projects, the effective rate of retention imposed on main contractors is much less (2.5% for a 8M 
project as shown in Fig. 1) although the rates for subcontracted work are much higher (10% for a 
200,000 package, 6% for a 1M package)! The use of back to back terms also suggests that defect 
liability period (DLP) is the same and front end trades (such as structural steel) can expect to receive 
their retentions back only at the end of the main contractor‟s (MC) DLP. Thus, one may argue that 
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this apparently fair practice of using back to back terms may result in higher retention rates and longer 
defects liability periods. Is this really the case? Is there a need for higher rates of retentions and longer 
DLPs? Perhaps, one needs to look at the purpose of retentions to answer this intriguing question (see: 
(Abeysekera and Soysa, 2012). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1: Sliding retention regime commonly used in New Zealand 
In formal construction, it is standard practice to use back to back contract terms. Thus, retention 
regimes imposed on main contractors are usually imposed on subcontractors too as it is considered to 
be fair by the main contractors. However, what is interesting about this practice is that on large 
projects, the effective rate of retention imposed on main contractors is much less (2.5% for a 8M 
project as shown in Fig. 1) although the rates for subcontracted work are much higher (10% for a 
200,000 package, 6% for a 1M package)! The use of back to back terms also suggests that defect 
liability period (DLP) is the same and front end trades (such as structural steel) can expect to receive 
their retentions back only at the end of the main contractor‟s (MC) DLP. Thus, one may argue that 
this apparently fair practice of using back to back terms may result in higher retention rates and longer 
defects liability periods. Is this really the case? Is there a need for higher rates of retentions and longer 
DLPs (Abeysekera and Zoysa, 2012). Perhaps, one needs to look at the purpose of retentions to 
answer this intriguing question. 
The debate on whether retentions are fair or unfair, whether favourable to one party than the other 
seems unresolved. Main contractors in New Zealand are keen on retaining retentions whilst 
subcontractors appear to oppose, or at least point out the unfavourable aspects including abuse 
(Abeysekera, 2002, 2008). This is not surprising given that main contractors in New Zealand could 
generate considerably large surpluses of cash deploying what Abeysekera (2005) had referred to as 
the „retention differentiation‟ strategy; indeed, an interesting mechanism for financing construction 
work reinforcing the author‟s Cash Cow Theory of Retentions not without beastly characteristics 
according to the author‟s Beast Theory of Retentions (Abeysekera, 2008). It must be noted that these 
theories are yet to be subjected to greater scrutiny by the academic community although the nature of 
„theory‟ is such that it is neither complete nor perfect with the opportunity to criticise and refine with 
greater understanding given that theory development is an on-going process (Shoemaker et al, 2004). 
It must also be mentioned that cases of front-end subcontractors such as those involved in demolition, 
excavation, concreting and structural steelwork are sometimes imposed high retention rates 
(Abeysekera and Soysa, 2012) and long DLPs, sometimes as long as 2 years, before they could get 
their retentions released. Given this background, it is easy to argue that contractors and subcontractors 
must be polarised on the issue of whether or not to use retentions in the form it is practiced in New 
Zealand. It is this „perceived‟ polarity that this paper attempts to resolve by investigating the 
perceptions of one of the front end trades, namely, the structural steel fabricators, in an industry where 
subcontracting is rampant.  
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3. METHODOLOGY 
As mentioned before the main aim of this study is to understand the perceptions of structural steel 
fabricators (SSF) with a view to ascertaining ways to resolve the retention polarity that appear to loom 
large in the New Zealand construction industry. 
This exploratory study focuses on SSF in Auckland (the most populous city in New Zealand) and 
where probably the largest number of structural steel fabricators resides. Whilst there are many 
structural steel subcontractors in Auckland, only contractors whose annual turnover was more than 
one million NZ dollars was selected as such subcontractors operate in the formal construction sector. 
Subcontractors with an annual turnover of NZ$ 12.5 to 20M were categorised as Large, 5 to 12.5M as 
Medium, and 1 to 5M as Small. 
A two-pronged approach was used for selection SSFs to be interviewed: Firstly, large scale 
contractors were contacted to identify well-known structural steel subcontractors, and secondly, 
subcontractors were asked to suggest names of others who were generally well known in the industry. 
Selections were limited to those who have been in industry for at least half a decade to ensure that 
they had a better understanding of the issues. In all eight subcontractors were selected based on their 
reputation. 
In order to improve the reliability of the data collected only directors, commercial managers, and chief 
quantity surveyors were interviewed. The interview guide was emailed to them prior to the meeting. 
Whilst most interviews were completed within an hour there were few which took over an hour. In 
one instance, the interview took about 2½ hours: In this instance, the director who was interviewed 
invited his Financial Controller to participate as well. 
The interview guide had 20 questions and a form for evaluation of alternative approaches to 
retentions. Data so collected were displayed using a conceptually clustered matrix. In doing so, the 
interview questions and responses were re-examined for potential concepts (or variables) by 
clustering several research questions together so as to generate meaning more easily. In other words, 
both a conceptual and an empirical approach were adopted when constructing these conceptually-
coherent matrices with columns representing the concepts and rows containing the names of SSF 
firms and their responses. In all nine matrices were constructed with one matrix devoted to the 
„context‟ of the situations being studied. 
4. PURPOSE OF RETENTIONS 
Unfortunately, it appears that none of the standard form contracts define or explain the purpose of 
retentions. According to many sources of literature, Das (2008) asserted that retentions are useful for 
the following purposes: 
 
 A fall back fund for the employer in case the contractor defaults or goes bankrupt; 
 As an incentive for completing a project as early as possible (as part of the money will 
become available at practical completion); 
 As a protection against any defects that might arise during the defects liability period; 
 To act as a deterrent against contractors who fail to respond without delay to rectify defects 
during the defects liability period 
 As a protection against any overpayments; and  
 As a fund to respond to any lien claims of unpaid suppliers (say in the event of a 
subcontractor abandons work). 
 
The importance of these considerations accentuate with respect to subcontract work as it is not 
common practice to use performance bonds despite back to back contract terms (which seems 
favourable towards subcontractors as subcontractors rarely provide such bonds) although it is not 
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clear whether retentions bonds would be accepted by main contractors. Given this background, the 
following non-performance situations usually covered by performance bonds as noted by Bunni 
(2005) can also be expected to be covered by retentions for subcontract work: 
 Improper execution of the works by the contractor involving material, plant, workmanship, or 
design leading to defective work or work not in accordance with the contract which is 
discovered during the contract period and ending with the issue of the final certificate; 
 Improper execution of the works by the contractor involving material, plant, workmanship, or 
design leading to defective work or work not in accordance with the contract which is 
discovered after the issue of the final certificate; 
 Delayed completion of the works beyond the stipulated date stated in the contract; and 
 Failure to complete the works as a result of the contractor‟s inability to continue with the 
performance of his contractual obligations. 
 
As part of this study, structural steel subcontractors were asked to explain the purpose of retentions. 
Their responses are given in Table 1. Thus, it is clear that subcontractors perceive that retentions are 
of „value‟ to main contractors and as such, it would be difficult to imagine that they would let go of 
this practice. 
Table 1: Purpose of retentions as perceived by structural steel subcontractors 
Size of Firm   Reasons for MCs holding retentions 
1. Large Quick response trigger for defective remedial work 
Cash flow  
Investment opportunities (e.g. purchase of land) 
2. Large  - 
3. Large Facilitate cash flows of MCs 
4. Medium As a warranty 
“Interest generating capability has been calculated into winning the 
job.” 
5. Medium Security of performance, risk of over certification (billing is not an 
exact science), positive cash flow for MCs. 
“The old thing about the 10% retention is that it gives the MCs greater 
comfort in using an untested subcontractor with an unviable price…! 
That‟s a quite real consideration”   
6. Medium - 
7. Small Quick response trigger for defective for remedial work (only reason) 
[Did not say about cash flow benefit to MCs]   
8. Small - 
 
Thus it seems useful to have retentions for subcontract work (from a main contractor‟s point of view). 
Given this scenario, it would be useful to understand the acceptability of retentions from the point of 
view of the structural steel subcontractors.  
5. ACCEPTABILITY OF RETENTIONS 
A representative selection of the types of responses received when the interviewees were questioned 
on whether „retentions‟ was an acceptable practice is given in Table 2. 
Results show that contrary to popular belief, subcontractors are not totally averse to the concept of 
retentions! In fact, the peaked central tendency of the inclinations (see number of responses in the 
second row of Table 2) suggests that the majority view is to accept (with reservations) rather than to 
reject. This middle ground seems useful for resolving retention polarity. However, in order to make 
better sense of the data, after some deliberation, four concepts were synthesised, i.e. „fairness‟, 
„reasonableness‟, „power‟ and „rights‟ all of which are grounded in the data itself (see underline 
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phrases in Table 2). These four concepts could play a significant role (with others) to diffuse the state 
of polarity that exists between contractors and subcontractors particularly by understanding concepts 
of „fairness‟ and „reasonableness‟. 
Table 2:  Acceptability of retentions and possible clusters for resolving polarities 
(Note: L,M,S refers to responses by large, medium, and small)    
Acceptable Acceptable with reservations Not acceptable 
1 (L) 5 (1L,2M, 2S) 2 (L,M) 
 
L: “Strategically 
advantageous to 
compete with 
smaller fabricators 
[A1]” 
 
L:  Duration of DLP: “We don‟t mind retentions to some degree. But, 
why should we wait for years and years after we‟ve finished the work… 
Retentions should be released three months after our completion…It is 
greatly abused…It is not fair [B1]”  
 
M: Rate of retention: “It is a form of security, [for] workmanship and 
quality, progress payments are never exactly quantified…I will qualify 
this statement by saying that 10% is not an acceptable practice when the 
main contractor has much less than that up against them. It is a very 
distorted situation where main contractors will generate positive cash 
flows through higher retentions…[B2] So, when it comes to completion, 
it‟s actually in main contractor‟s interest to not complete projects [not 
common though]. I am quite happy with retentions but it is the 
application of the scale that is objectionable [C1].”  
 
S: Rate of retention: “Absolutely, it should be there…[B3]We all want to 
play safe…You need to look at both sides and I think, it is a fair thing 
[B4] to have…. You can‟t really eliminate. To be reasonable [C2], rates 
[should be reduced to] 5% and DLP to 3 months from our sectional 
completion.” 
 
M: Interest for moneys held “It is there for a purpose [C3]. But we must 
get interest. The client has a right [D1] to keep our money but it is our 
money. If [at all] he should return our money with interest [D2].”(M) 
 
S: Retention rate: “Need for some form [B5] but 10% is not acceptable 
[C4]. On A 400,000 job what can go wrong is only special coatings (if 
any) and this will not cost so much[C5]” 
 
 
L: Pre-trade quality issues “Normally 
retentions are based on quality of 
work. Lot of our work is based on 
what we are given to work with. 
When we hand over our work steel 
must be plumb, true and correct. But, 
when they handover the concrete to 
us, it is not plumb, it is not true, and 
not correct…[B6] You have to accept 
to work your way through it…. They 
say they use a ISO 9001 system yet 
they get nothing is right…When we 
are handed a floor, it‟s 25mil out, 
bolts are miles out, nothing is level, 
and nothing is checked… They must 
have good quality controls. We work 
according to specs. The builder should 
have someone to check that we are 
working according to specs. If you are 
not, should they not tell you as you 
are doing the work? Why check 
something when it‟s finished? [C6]”  
 
Retentions create a big-brother 
syndrome.[A2]” 
 
M: Cost “I think it is stupid. It is an 
additional cost[C7]”  
Concepts Fairness (B)  Reasonableness (C) Power (A) Rights 
Indicators B1,B2,B3,B4,B5,B6  C1,C2,C3,C4,C5,C6,C7 A1,A2 D1,D2 
 
Concerns for 
subcontractors 
Duration of DLP; Quality of work of 
other front-end trade; Better cash-
flows for MCs 
Rate; Interest for moneys held; 
type of defects 
- Interests for 
retentions held 
 
6. ACCEPTABILITY THE DEFECTS LIABILITY PERIOD 
Shown in Table 3 are the responses received when subcontractors were questioned on the 
acceptability of a defects liability period for structural steel work. 
Once again it appears that subcontractors are not totally averse to having a defect liability period but 
what concerns them is the duration of such periods, quantum of retentions held, and timely release. 
This raises some fundamental questions on the issues mentioned above (rate, duration, release) in 
relation to what is fair and reasonable. In other words, is there a rational basis for setting up a 
retention regime for subcontract work whilst meeting subcontractor‟s test of fairness and 
reasonableness? Unfortunately, this is an issue that needs to be investigated further. Understanding 
defects regime for structural steelwork would assist but it is not sufficient. Investigations carried 
under this study reveal that most of the defects seem to be in relation to paint coatings which are not 
costly to remedy although the greatest risk seems to be when such problems arise during the defects 
liability period. 
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On the other hand, are there solutions to overcome some of the concerns related to fairness and 
reasonableness expressed by subcontractors? Are there win-win solutions? 
 
Table 3: Acceptability of Defects Liability Period 
Acceptable Acceptable with reservations Not acceptable 
2 (L,M) 3 (L,M,S) 3 (2L,M) 
 
M: DLP for coatings “Defects period is necessary. 
You can enter into say whether the DL is limited 
only to the coatings [as] generally nothing should 
go wrong with steel but that is splitting ears…It is 
just as simple to take it overall.”  
 
Cost of remedial work: Rework extreme cases – 
25%; on the average 10%. 99% of the time with 
paint coatings. 
Frequency of projects with defects: “Very rare. In 
5 yrs. it must be handful of projects with varying 
degrees of work.” 
 
Comparison with other trades: “It is not like air-
conditioning or things like that where you can 
technical problems and other situations where the 
following trades are painting over someone else‟s 
work. We don‟t encounter such problems.” 
 
Latent defects/Duration of DLP: “It is usually not 
until well into the defects period if not the end of 
the defects period…Coatings don‟t fail over the 
short term. [So the long wait is reasonable?] 
Absolutely – from the owner‟s point of view” 
 
M: “It is ok. The Client should also have 
something.” 
 
L: Duration of DLP: Maintenance period after our 
practical completion should be 3 months.  
Dealing with latent defects: “If there is a problem we 
will fix it because we want to work with these guys” 
Minimal risks to contractors: “Risk is so minimal. It 
is not existent.” 
 
M: Risk to contractors: “I have no issues with the 
DLP. It limits our exposure. We are not indefinitely 
held to the performance of an item that we are doing. 
That means there is a set time frame that we 
guarantee this single work for. That also offers the 
client a form of warranty that if something is going to 
go wrong it‟s likely to go wrong within that time 
frame and therefore there is some redress to get it 
fixed.” 
 
Duration of DLP/Nature of trade: “Industries like 
reinforcing concrete. Once the steel is in the concrete 
there is nothing that can really go wrong or happen. 
So, they don‟t accept DL periods. Likewise, we have 
tried to reduce our DL to reduce to 3 or 6 mths.  
 
DLP from subs completion: Typically MCs adopt 12 
mths but that too we try to negotiate from our 
practical completion and not from MCs.” 
 
S: Yes with reservations 
 
L: Type of trade: “Useful 
but not with respect to steel 
work as any defects are 
immediately visible.” 
 
S:Inefficient specifications: 
“Sometimes steel is 
exposed inside the 
building. They don‟t 
specify any [protection]. 
Shop priming is not 
enough”  
 
“The problem we have 
faced is only touch up 
paint. So many trades work 
on ours. There are 
problems of damages 
during erection. But, so far 
as retentions are concerned 
I don‟t think these have 
anything to do with it.” 
 
L: No 
 
7. VALUE OF RETENITION SOLUTIONS AND THEIR FEASIBILITY 
Interviewees were requested to provide a rating for seven solutions based on their value perceptions 
with „A‟ for solutions that were of much value, „B‟ for moderate value, and „C‟ for no value. A brief 
description was given to explain what a retention-based fund is (Abeysekera,2005), but no 
explanations were provided against other solutions though it would have been useful in hindsight. 
The results in Table 4 show that „trust accounts‟ and a „retention-based fund‟ were of value. It is not 
surprising that the use of warranties instead of retentions was another good solution. Interestingly, the 
practice of negotiating a better retention regime was perceived as valuable given the success some 
subcontractors have had though not everyone indicated that they had done so or tried to do so. 
However, according to Abeysekera‟s Cash Cow Theory, it would be difficult for New Zealand 
contractors to let go a „free‟ financing facility (i.e. the opportunity to create surplus cash through 
retention differentiation described earlier) given that trust accounts, retention-based funds, and 
warranties are solutions that nullify the cash flow benefit main contractors could have by 
differentiating retention regimes (Abeysekera, 2006) particular when using back to back contract 
terms with work packages of less than 200,000 dollars which attracts a retention of rate of 10% as the 
per the commonly practiced declining rate of retention (see Fig. 1). In fact, all the solutions barring 
the first solution (negotiating favourable regimes) would have a strong negative impact on the cash 
flow of a main contractor.  This raises the question whether there are any win-win solutions, which is 
discussed in the next section. 
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Table 4: Rated retention solutions rated 
Solution 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Size of Firm  
  
Negotiate 
favourable 
regimes 
Trust 
a/c 
Interest 
bearing 
a/c 
Retention
-based 
fund 
Performance 
bonds 
Retention 
bonds 
Warranties 
instead of 
retentions 
1. Large - A B B A A A 
2. Large  - C C C C C A 
3. Large B A B B A B A 
4. Medium A B B B A A A 
5. Medium - A A A B B A 
6. Medium A A A A B B A 
7. Small A B C A C C C 
8. Small A B B A B B C 
Summary:        
A 4 4 2 4 3 2 6 
B 1 3 4 3 3 3 - 
C - 1 2 1 2 3 2 
Total responses 5 8 8 8 8 8 7 
Conceptual 
value score (%) 
90 69 50 69 56 44 75 
Weights for conceptual value scores: A – 2; B- 1; C-0 
 
8. WIN-WIN SOLUTIONS 
Given that most of the preferred solutions have a negative impact on contractor‟s cash flow (see Cash 
Cow Theory), it would be interesting to find out whether there are any other solutions that might be of 
value to the contracting parties. Subcontractors‟ responses are given in Table 5. Results show that 
there are more solutions than originally envisaged (e.g. treating each trade and subcontract differently) 
but these are not necessarily win-win solutions. In fact, retention solutions can be categorised into 
four main types, viz. subcontractor focussed, contractor focussed, mutually beneficial solutions, and 
industry focussed solutions. 
The current retention regimes with higher rates of retention for subcontractors than for main 
contractors seem favourable to contractors. So is the case when back to back contract terms are used 
with final retentions released at main contractor‟s practical completion. Solutions such as eliminating 
retentions, trust accounts, or mobilisation advances (from contractors) have a negative impact on 
contractor‟s cash flow with no extra benefit to contractors. These are subcontractor focussed 
solutions. 
Mutually beneficial solutions are not too many. Negotiating retention regimes is one such and aligns 
well with the following suggestion: 
“Treat each subcontract on its merit rather than as a head contract thing. 
Each trade to be treated on its own merit.” 
In fact, there does not seem to be too much rationality in treating all subcontractors alike. Clearly, 
there are subcontractors who meet contractors‟ expectations time and time again: Indeed, it may be 
argued that they receive better terms incentivising their performance further (see Abeysekera‟s 
Steroid Theory of Retentions, 2008). Moreover, there is no apparent reason why all trades should be 
treated alike as well. Indeed, this is a positive way forward which seems to be in harmony with the 
test of fairness and reasonableness that subcontractors seek. 
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Table 5: Perceptions on win-win solutions 
Size of Firm   Solution 
1. Large “Not really” 
2. Large  “Do away retentions. “Quality control is the secret” 
3. Large “Treat each subcontract on its merit rather than as a head contract thing. 
Each trade to be treated on its own merit.” 
4. Medium “Eliminate retentions. Reduce costs for the client.” 
5. Medium “Trust fund could be a practical solution unlike bonding” 
“If you look at the big picture it is in their interest to not hold on to the cash 
because long term positive cash flow is a temporary substitute for lack of 
profitability. They can overcome working capital restrictions through exploiting 
subcontractors‟ cash flow to grow and thereby increase competitiveness amongst 
their own ranks. So, if they were to look at it from a big picture point of view, it 
would actually be advantageous to remove that ability.”   
6. Medium MC to give a mobilisation advance to cope with cash flow problems. If that is the 
case, retentions are ok: “If they want a job done, then they must invest and not 
us.”  
7. Small Strongly advocates retentions [with emphasis on reduction of time period for 
release] 
“The first thing, I would say is to negotiate. The second would be the retention-
based guarantee.” 
8. Small Ideally there shouldn‟t be retentions; cover through insurance. 
Smaller retention margin about 5% reducing to 2 ½% on practical completion. 
More regulated and a structured way of getting the money back. We don‟t know 
when the builder reaches practical completion. Half the time we don‟t know. Even 
when people are living in the building we still don‟t know whether the builder has 
got PC. 
However, the nature of the relationship that contractors have with subcontractors is such that they 
might exercise their position of power to negate any apparently mutually beneficial solutions in 
favour of self-centred solutions (also see Abeysekera‟s, Beast Theory of Retentions, 2008). As such, 
one wonders whether it would be possible and desirable to develop industry-focussed, trade-specific 
solutions which are fair and reasonable. In this regard, it would be useful to assess their perceptions 
on the role of government and industry associations. 
9. ROLE OF GOVERNMENT AND INSUTRY ASSOCIATIONS 
It was noted earlier that the amount of retentions to be held was legislated in New Zealand as far back 
as 1892 and later abolished in 1987 for industry to regulate its own mechanisms.  The Construction 
Contract Act (CCA) 2003, did not make any reference to retention-issues. Although provisions under 
the Act could be used to overcome payment problems (particularly when payments are not released), 
by and large, it left contracting parties to agree on contract terms on their free will. As so long as the 
parties did so, such contract terms were seen as fair and reasonable irrespective of whether retention 
rates were too high or whether defects liability periods were too long. 
Interestingly, some respondents pointed out as noted in Table 6 that CCA could be broadened to deal 
with any unfair and unreasonable practices. As such, one way forward would be to develop some 
„regulations‟ (similar to what has been achieved under the Health and Safety in Employment Act) or 
to have an endorsed code of practice for fair and reasonable contracting which will in due course 
change the behaviour of contractors as noted by another (see Table 6). Thus, is there a pressing case 
for government‟s involvement? It is worth noting that none of the subcontracting organisations seem 
to have lobbied the government thus far on a possible way forward.  Would it be of public interest? 
Perhaps, there are other organisations that need to be consulted such as the Master Builders 
Association, Association of Consulting Engineers, Standards New Zealand for a nationally agreed 
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standard form of contract for subcontract work along with a set of guidance notes if this approach is to 
be pursued when searching for a fair and reasonable solution to the retention polarity. 
Table 6: The role of government 
Size of Firm   Role of Government 
1. Large Construction Contracts Act to be broadened to regulate retentions. Set 
up retention based guarantee fund. 
2. Large  “Limit retentions – maximum of 1- 2.5%. If MCs can‟t show that there 
is a fault, they should pay the money out. 
3. Large Should be legislated. Give guidelines for holding retentions.  
4. Medium “If the government was involved that competitive aspect of utilising 
retentions was removed for every one – to put everyone on an even 
playing field.” 
5. Medium “They need a certain level of protection. They don‟t have the 
commercial knowledge.” 
6. Medium “It is our money somebody is holding. Hold it in a trust or [something 
like that] where we can earn interest…” 
7. Small “CCA is good. It is working. It will take time.” It has changed the 
behaviour of contractors. The government can set up a guarantee fund. 
Specify maintenance periods with respect to trade. 
8. Small “Industry should be able to regulate itself”. 
 
According to Abeysekera‟s „Retentions as Chaos‟ Theory (2008) the retention-scenario in New 
Zealand is chaotic. Given this situation, Abeysekera claims that understanding the behaviour of 
chaotic systems may assist in taking new approaches for dealing with the retention-chaos. However, it 
is cautioned that there is considerable difficulty in predicting the outcome of interventions (such as 
introducing legislation) although by creating more chaos, it should be possible to move a chaotic 
system to a more orderly state by pushing it to the edge of chaos; leaving industry to regulate itself 
may not actually manifest in a new order from this perspective. 
10. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Contrary to popular belief, structural steel subcontractors are not averse to retentions with most taking 
a middle ground. Nevertheless, the situation in New Zealand is such that they see the need for 
solutions which are fair and reasonable concerning retentions rates, release mechanisms, and defects 
liability period in relation to the types of defects they need to be held accountable. The current 
practice of using back-to-back contract terms which appears to be fair and reasonable to main 
contractors is not perceived so by the subcontractors interviewed when taking their responses as a 
whole. There is a need to investigate further as to what constitutes fair and reasonable particularly in 
relation to how a retention regime may be set up for subcontract work. 
Most of the solutions that seem to be fair and reasonable to subcontractors impact negatively on main 
contractors‟ cash flow. As such, it is will be difficult for main contractors to forgo this benefit (as per 
the Cash Cow Theory of Retentions) without some form of reciprocity, or trade-off, such as good 
performance, price discounts, mobilisation advances from clients, or through some other form of 
reciprocal response given that contractors in New Zealand seem to need at least 10% of retentions for 
the risks they take with regard to most type of building work (Abeysekera and Soysa, 2012). Perhaps, 
this observation could lead to what may be referred to as the „theory of retention-reciprocity‟ to add to 
the five theories on retentions the author proposed in 2008. 
According to Fehr and Gächter (2000), economic models have typically portrayed humans as 
exclusively self-centred beings. As such, what percentage of people or organisations would be 
interested in the concept of fairness and reasonableness is a concern. However, many people deviate 
from purely self-centred (i.e. self-interested) behaviour in a reciprocal manner (Fehr and Gächter, 
2000). According to these authors, many studies have shown that reciprocal types vary between 40-
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66% whilst self-centred types vary between 20-30%. This is indeed fortunate, as selfish behaviour 
does not embody fairness and reasonableness whereas reciprocal behaviour is; in other words, there is 
said to be reciprocity fairness when people reciprocate in a „tit-for-tat‟ manner.  Whilst there is no 
information on reciprocal behaviour for those who operate in the construction industry, there appears 
to be role for the government or industry associations given that not all contractors would display 
reciprocity-fairness. Interestingly, it is in this respect that there seems to be a role for government and 
industry organisations given that some respondents had suggested amending CCA to deal with unfair 
and unreasonable practices. Moreover, this approach would neutralise the imbalance of power in the 
contracting relationship. However, this must be done with care as the nature of chaotic systems seems 
difficult to predict according to theory of „Retentions as Chaos‟ described by the author. As to 
whether such actions should make a distinction between different building trades (as suggested by a 
respondent) or whether it should be common to all trades needs further investigation whilst 
augmenting this study with trades involved with civil construction. 
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